Strong Families or Patriarchal Economies? Southern European Labor Markets and Welfare in Comparative Perspective by Mary C. King
RSC 2002/14 © 2002 Mary C. King 
 




Strong Families or Patriarchal Economies? Southern European 
Labor Markets and Welfare in Comparative Perspective 
 
 





RSC No. 2002/14 
Mediterranean Programme Series 
 
 






















EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE RSC 2002/14 © 2002 Mary C. King 
All rights reserved. 
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form  





























© 2002 Mary C. King 
Printed in Italy in March 2002 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI) 
Italy Mediterranean Programme
The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support
for four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770
http://www.iue.it/RSC/MEDABSTRACT

Strong family networks in Southern Europe are often credited with protecting
people from poverty in circumstances where both employment and social
benefits are limited. However it may well be that the economies frequently
described as “familial” are more strongly patriarchal than other market
economies, concentrating income in the hands of older, married men through
both the labor market and welfare state, and creating the combination of weak
welfare states, strong family networks, low female labor force participation, and
the concentration of unemployment among young people. This paper uses
Luxembourg Income Study micro-data to assess the degree to which the
Southern European economies may be said to be patriarchal, and explores the
consequences of reduced economic autonomy for women and young men. A
picture of two types of patriarchal economies emerges. The first is the familial,
Mediterranean economy and the second is the liberal, American economy where
weak social welfare programs are combined with worsening market prospects of
the young.
 This paper was presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research
Meeting, Florence, March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre
for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.INTRODUCTION

It is frequently claimed that strong family networks contribute to social welfare
in the countries of Southern Europe. For instance, many have suggested that
strong family networks ameliorate the potentially extremely destructive
combination of high unemployment rates and weak welfare states. Caspar,
Garfinkel and McLanahan (1994) have shown that Italy’s high rates of marriage
and low rates of single motherhood prevent the gender disparities in the
incidence of poverty found elsewhere, a result echoed for Spain (Fernandez-
Morales and de Haro-Garcia 1998). De la Rica and Lemieux (1994) assert that
family ties are key to the workability of the Spanish labor market, which
combines expensive, mandated health benefits in the formal sector with a large
informal sector; married women and young, single people work
disproportionately in the informal sector, gaining their health benefits through a
covered worker in the family and providing the “flexibility” in the Spanish
labor market.
Indeed, Francesca Bettio and Paola Villa (1998) go further, arguing that
not only do family networks compensate for weak welfare states in Southern
Europe, but that the family plays a large role in service provision in place of a
more developed tertiary sector—both public and private.
While this paper focuses almost exclusively on Europe, the
“Mediterranean Model” (Bettio and Villa, 1998) may be increasingly
descriptive of the economies of the Middle East and North Africa, which are
distinguished by several of it’s attributes: high youth unemployment rates, low
rates of female labor force participation, weak welfare states, a high reliance on
family networks for social insurance and—recently—declining fertility rates
(Yousef 2001, Olmsted 2001).
However, a less benign characterization of the strong family networks of
the Mediterranean is possible. It may be that in societies where patriarchal
legacies are particularly strong, neither labor markets nor welfare states offer
much for women or young men, whose allegiance is demanded by the family.
With income concentrated in the hands of older, married men, women and
young men must stay firmly attached to the family, enjoy less personal
autonomy, and perhaps “pay” for their keep by providing unpaid labor to the
family unit. In other words, it may be contemporary patriarchal economies that
 The author would like to thank Jennifer Olmsted and Tarik Yousef for organizing the
superb workshop of which this paper was originally written, all workshop participants for
their helpful comments, Sylvia Melchiorri for excellent research assistance with Italian
sources, and Clifford Lehman for his analytical critique.6
simultaneously create the package of weak welfare states, strong family
networks, low female labor force participation and the concentration of
unemployment among the young seen in Mediterranean economies.
This paper is conceived as an exploratory foray to assess the degree to
which Mediterranean economies—as exemplified by those in Southern
Europe—might be considered to be particularly patriarchal, to be characterized
by a concentration of income in the hands of older, married men. The first
section consists of the theoretical context for understanding a “patriarchal
economy.” The second section presents the evidence from the literature on the
relative strength of the welfare state in different countries, focusing on the
potential concentration of public benefits on older married men and the
comparison of Mediterranean countries with other nations. The third section
gathers comparative labor market information, including unemployment and
labor force participation rates, as well as unpaid work hours. The fourth section
presents the author’s calculations of the comparative concentration of income in
the hands of older, married men in eight nations, based on Luxembourg Income
Study microdata. The fifth section concludes.
I. THEORETICAL CONTEXT
A leading feminist economist defined patriarchy as materially based on “men’s
control over women’s labor power “(Hartmann 1981, p. 15). Preceding
capitalism, patriarchy was an economic system in which “men controlled the
labor of women and children in the family” (Hartmann 1976, p. 138). Now, in
much of the world, the two systems of patriarchy and capitalism exist in
relations of “mutual accommodation” (Hartmann, 1976, p. 137).
Job segregation by sex…is the primary mechanism in capitalist society that maintains the
superiority of men over women, because it enforces lower wages for women in the labor
market. Low wages keep women dependent on men because they encourage women to
marry. Married women must perform domestic chores for their husbands. Men benefit,
then, from both higher wages and the domestic division of labor. This domestic division of
labor, in turn, acts to weaken women’s position in the labor market. Thus the hierarchical
domestic division of labor is perpetuated by the labor market, and vice versa (Hartmann
1976, p. 139).
Occupational segregation by sex, then, reflects the continuing operation of a
patriarchal economic system, neither necessary to nor created by the dynamics
of a market economy—though in the analysis of Marxist political economy,
hierarchical social divisions in the labor force such as gender or race are
functional for capital (e.g. Reich 1981). It is sex segregation in the labor market
that creates lower wages for women, weakening their bargaining position in the
family with the result that women provide the vast preponderance of unpaid7
reproductive work, including childcare, eldercare, cooking, cleaning and
marketing.
A weak welfare state, one that does little to socialize either the costs or
the work of social reproduction born disproportionately by women, then also
functions to sustain a patriarchal economic system. This is particularly true if
the welfare state programs that do exist are geared primarily to the needs of
men, via the provision of old age pensions or unemployment insurance, rather
than mothers’ allowances, subsidized childcare, public health care or income
maintenance programs tied more to the exigencies of childrearing than to the
potential problems of wage-earners.
The particular evolution of social institutions in the context of a
patriarchal economic system may reinforce the economically marginal position
of women. For instance school and shop hours that are incompatible with most
work schedules serve to keep low earners—frequently women—out of the labor
market in order to accomplish key reproductive tasks such as childcare and
shopping. Similarly the lack of part-time employment may keep people charged
with reproductive tasks—women--from participating in the labor market.
Patriarchal economic systems may include “relations of domination
between fathers and sons as well as between men and women (Folbre 1980, p.
5).” Historically, in the agricultural economies of Europe and the U.S., young
men were tied to their fathers’ farms, effectively trading their adolescent and
young adult labor for inheritance of the land. Improved land represented both
the essential capital stake for setting up an independent household and the
specific investment of considerable labor on the part of the sons. The clear
connection between the age of inheritance and the age of marriage in the
historical record demonstrates the degree to which concentration of family
wealth in the hands of fathers held sons as laborers in the patriarchal household
(Folbre 1980, Tilly and Scott 1978).
In short then, relations of patriarchal economic domination of women and
young men have been maintained historically through the sexual division of
labor and inheritance practices. They are now sustained by women’s low wages
and limited job opportunities, high unemployment rates for young men, welfare
states that are weak or geared primarily to male breadwinners, and the familial
social systems characteristic of—but not exclusive to—the Mediterranean.
II. COMPARING WELFARE STATES
Classification of welfare states by type and level of generosity has intrigued a
number of scholars, creating a substantial literature. Prominent in this field is
Gosta Esping-Andersen, upon whose work this paper will rely for measures of
the strength of the welfare state in different countries. Esping-Andersen (1990)8
created an index by which to judge the strength and type of welfare state
evident in different countries, which he termed a de-commodification score.
In pre-capitalist societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that
their survival was contingent upon the sale of their labor power. It is as markets
become universal and hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend
entirely on the cash nexus. Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed
social reproduction outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In
turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure
commodity status. De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter
of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market
(Esping Andersen 1990, pp. 21-22).
Esping-Andersen based his de-commodification score upon the generosity and
availability of old age pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment insurance
payments. His method yields the scores and ranking that appear in Table 1
below. The scores represent only an index number, nothing further, and higher
scores indicate greater de-commodification.
Esping-Andersen (1990) categorizes the three groupings of countries
generated by the de-commodification scores as
(a)  liberal states, where de-commodification is minimal and the
market holds sway;
(b)  conservative states, where a moderate amount of de-
commodification has occurred as a result of conservative or
Catholic reformism, bounded by “powerful social-control
devices, such as a proven record of strong employment
attachment or strong familial obligations” (Esping-Andersen
1990, p. 53); and
(c)  social democratic states, where de-commodification has
preceded to the greatest degree, in previously liberal states
that labor has captured for social democracy.9
























Source: Gosta Esping-Andersen. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 52.
This categorization is now somewhat problematic. It is not clear that the three
more generous nations in the “liberal” group belong there, rather than in the
middle category. The events of the intervening years have probably shifted
Austria into the conservative group. More important for the purposes of this
paper, Esping-Anderson was not yet interested in investigating what has come
to be called the Mediterranean type, including Italy, Greece and Spain (Bettio
and Villa, 1998)
1. Italy is the lone example of these among countries
investigated, and it appears to have the weakest welfare state of the
1 And the “Mediterranean” label itself is not sufficiently precise, as it should not include France, given the
character of the French welfare state. Clearly the distinction must rest upon the predominant political philosophy
of a nation, which is only sometimes related to its geographical location.10
conservative group, influenced in Esping-Andersen’s account both by
Catholicism and by Fascism.
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) categorization was tremendously influential,
and also much criticized. Feminists in particular found his account of the
welfare state and de-commodification to be exclusively and inexplicably
focused on the male experience. Esping-Andersen’s implicit model citizen
clearly worked for pay, unless old, sick or unemployed, and did not seem to
bear any responsibility for child- or elder-care.
In response to criticism, Esping-Andersen went on to examine the extent
to which different welfare state regimes had pursued “defamilialization,” a term
first proposed by his critics and understood by Esping-Andersen as a course that
would “unburden the household and diminish individuals’ welfare dependence
on kinship (Esping-Andersen 1999).” Interestingly, de-familialization reduces
women’s dependence upon marriage as an economic strategy for a decent
livelihood, often promoting their commodification through increased
participation in the labor market. As framed by Orloff (1993), two key elements
of any gender-sensitive assessment of welfare states are (1) access to paid work,
for married women as well as other citizens, and (2) women’s capacity to form
and maintain autonomous households, so that women have viable alternatives to
marriage, even—or especially—if they have children.
Table 2 presents Esping-Andersen’s measures of the degree to which
welfare states attempt de-familialization. This analysis prompted him to
separate the “conservative” category into two: (a) Continental Europe including
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands and (b) Southern
Europe, here comprised of Italy, Portugal and Spain. His aim in distinguishing
Southern Europe from Continental Europe is to assess the degree to which the
Mediterranean nations are more familial than others, as is often asserted.
Clearly the countries that spend the lowest proportion of their GDP on publicly
provided family services are Italy and Spain, in the Mediterranean grouping,
and Canada and Ireland, in the liberal category. Public childcare for children
younger than three is provided to the greatest extent in social democratic
regimes and in “conservative” continental Europe
2.  Interestingly, child
benefits—cash payments or tax reductions for families with children—are also
highest in social democratic and conservative, continental nations, and lowest in
the Mediterranean (Esping Andersen 1999, p. 72) Public assistance with in-
home care of the elderly is lowest in Southern Europe, though relatively high
only in Scandinavia. By these measures, de-familialization is a strategy pursued
2 According to Barbara Bergmann (1996), the motivation on the part of the French is patriotic,
to acculturate young children.11
by the social democratic and conservative, continental nations, and least evident
in Southern Europe.
One caveat may call into question the degree to which defamilization has
proceeded in the liberal regimes, at least with regard to state support for
reproduction. While the United States appears to devote a much larger
proportion of GDP to social spending than do Spain and Italy, in fact much of
this spending occurs in the form of tax expenditures, tax reductions for families
with children. To the degree that these increase with income, greater support is
provided to families with higher earnings, far disproportionately those, which
include a male earner (Folbre 2001). In practice, to receive this state support
women must remain married.
And finally, we should note that while differences among nations appear
significant, in fact none of them is spending even three percent of GDP on
family services. We may be making too much of the distinctions between them.
These measures relate primarily to the potential defamilization of women,
geared as they are to assessing the degree to which the state is taking
responsibility for reproduction. However, unemployed young men are in a
situation with some parallels to that of women in the family. Without earnings,
they are dependent upon the family and the state. For completeness, this
analysis must include the extent to which welfare states are compensating for
youth unemployment in different countries. This data is important for assessing
the patriarchal nature of different welfare state regimes.
While I do not have direct or comprehensive evidence on this point, Italy,
Greece and Spain appear to spend the highest proportion of their social transfers
on old age pensions of 15 European countries and to be among the lowest third
in the proportion of social transfers devoted to unemployment insurance
(ISTAT 2000). Italian households headed by someone over 65 receive 57
percent of public transfers, while those headed by someone between the ages of
51 and 65 receive 27 percent, leaving a very small portion
for younger families (Banca D’Italia 2000).12
Table 2
Esping-Andersen’s De-Familialization Measures for Welfare States
Public spending Percent of Percent of elderly
on family services children <3 in receiving public
(% GDP) public childcare home-help
1992 1980s 1990
Social democratic regimes
Denmark 1.98 48 22
Finland 1.53 22 24
Norway 1.31 12 16
Sweden 2.57 29 16
Liberal regimes
Australia 0.15 2 7
Canada 0.08 4 2
Ireland 0.06 1 3
United Kingdom 0.48 2 9
United States 0.28 1 4
Continental Europe
Austria 0.25 2 3
Belgium 0.10 20 6
France 0.37 20 7
Germany 0.54 3 2
Netherlands 0.57 2 8
Southern Europe
Italy 0.08 5 1
Portugal 0.16 4 1
Spain 0.04 3 2
Japan 0.22 n.a. 1
Source: Gosta Esping-Andersen. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 71.
III. COMPARING LABOR MARKETS
This section of the paper examines published, statistical evidence on the labor
market and the family division of labor to assess the degree to which the
economies of Southern Europe may be said to be particularly patriarchal.13
The Labor Market
Access to the labor market is a crucial component of economic autonomy in a
market economy. To explore the degree to which older men enjoy greater access
to the labor market than do women and younger men, we examine ratios of
labor force participation rates and unemployment rates
3. Table 3 presents the
ratio of women’s labor force participation to that of men’s, as well as the ratio
of the labor force participation rate of men in their early twenties to men in their
late forties and early fifties. In addition, the relative unemployment rates of men
in these same age categories is included. The data on unemployment and that on
labor force participation are both provided in an attempt to include the
experience of young men who may not be looking for work because they
believe that none is available.
In Table 3, these ratios are organized into country groups as suggested by
Esping-Andersen’s categories; a clear divide emerges between the familial
economies of southern Europe and Asia and the other regime types represented.
Women’s labor force participation rates relative to those of men are clearly
lowest in the “familial” nations, followed by the Asian countries, the
continental, the liberal and finally the social democratic countries, where they
reach their peak at 93 percent of men’s in Sweden.
Patterns are a bit more muddled for young men vis a vis older men, but it does
appear that unemployment is relatively concentrated among the young in the
nations deemed more familial, including those in Asia. By far the highest
concentration of unemployment among the young is found in Italy, Greece and
Korea. Further, it is not true that high youth unemployment is a simple function
of higher overall unemployment; the nations with the highest male
unemployment rates in 1997—Spain, Finland, France, Sweden and Ireland—do
not show particularly high concentrations of unemployment among the young
4.
3  Another indicator of a patriarchal economy might be large differences in the wages of
women and men, or younger and older men. While the gender wage gap does not appear to be
particularly large in the Mediterranean nations, it is difficult to have confidence in this
measure, given the size of the informal sector in both Italy and Spain and the concentration of
women in the informal sector (Blau and Kahn 2000, Rubery 1998, Rubery et al 1998).
4 These cross-sectional differences in the degree to which joblessness is concentrated among
the young are set in an environment in which relative youth unemployment has been rising
generally in the advanced countries. Young people’s prospects appear to be declining despite
their relatively small numbers and high levels of education (Blanchflower and Freeman 2000).14
Table 3
Relative Employment Outcomes for Women and Men, and for Younger
Men and Older Men, 1997*
Relative labor force Relative labor force Relative unemployment
participation rates of participation rates of rates of younger and older























United States 0.83 .922.9
United Kingdom 0.80 .942.3
*Ratios are rates for men aged 20-24 as a proportion of rates for men aged 45-
54, except in the case of Italy where ratios are rates for men aged 20-24 as a
proportion of rates for men aged 40-49.
aData for Portugal are from the year 1996.
Source: Author’s calculations from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development. 1999. Labour Force Statistics 1977-1997. Paris: OECD.15
This pattern re-appears in the male labor force participation ratios, though the
familial, Asian and conservative nations appear more similar than in the relative
incidence of male unemployment. The liberal states are at the other extreme,
with nearly comparable rates of labor force participation for young and middle-
aged men. The social democracies are in the middle on this measure.
Thus far, it does appear that the “strong family” of the Mediterranean is
characterized by the economic dependence of women and young men on older,
married men. Neither labor markets nor welfare states in the “familial” nations
offer as much for women or young men as they do elsewhere. And economic
dependence may be expected to entail reduced personal autonomy, deference to
patriarchal authority, and greater obligations in the form of unpaid work.
The unpaid obligations of women to the family are clear, and obvious in
the premise of a family-based social insurance system. Women are providing
the bulk of the childcare, elder care, health care and other services that might
otherwise be supplemented by a strong social welfare system. Table 4 presents
Esping-Andersen’s data on the degree to which families are providing key
social services.
As shown, women’s unpaid work weeks are quite high in Italy and Spain
relative to other European countries, to North America or even to Japan. It’s
also clear that a far higher proportion of elderly people and unemployed young
people are living in a multi-generational household in Southern Europe.
(However, as Esping-Andersen (1999) points out, in many countries where the
aged tend not to live with their children, they are still cared for by their
children; the price of housing and other factors are presumably influential as
well).
It may also be true that in the Mediterranean countries young men are
expected to make significant contributions of unpaid, or poorly paid, labor in
the home or in family enterprises, as was true historically on the farms of
Europe and the U.S; this point requires further research.
IV. EVIDENCE FROM THE LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY
As a first step in investigating the degree to which the labor market and welfare
programs in different countries might be said to favor older married men--to
demonstrate more patriarchal characteristics--Luxembourg Income Study micro-
data were examined for eight different countries. These eight countries were
chosen to include two representative of each national type considered by
Esping-Andersen and other scholars to be familial, conservative, social
democratic and liberal. Italy and Spain represent familial nations, France and
Germany conservative ones, Norway and Sweden are social democratic, and the16
U.S. and Australia represent liberal economies. All data are from 1994 or 1995,
with the exception of the data for Spain, which are from 1990.
Table 4
Esping-Andersen’s Data on Family Welfare Provision
Percentage of aged Percentage of Women’s weekly
living with children unemployed youth unpaid household hours
(mid 1980s) living with parents (1985-1990)
(1991-93)
Southern Europe 
Italy 39 81 45.4
Spain 37 63 45.8
Continental Europe
France 20 42 36.0
Germany 14 11 35.0
Netherlands 8 28 38.7
Social Democracies
Denmark 4 8 24.6
Norway 11 - 31.6
Sweden 5 - 34.2
Liberal Regimes
Canada - 27 32.8
United Kingdom 16 35 30.0
United States 15 28 31.9
Asia
Japan 65 - 33.1
________________________________________________________________
__
Source: Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 63.
The population over fifteen years of age in each country was divided into eight
categories: never married women and men, married women and men under the
age of 30, married women and men 30 and older, and women and men who had
been married, but are now separated, divorced or widowed
5. The sources of
5 In the cases of Spain and Sweden, the categorization is more limited. Three classifications
exist for marital status for the Spanish data, married, unmarried and unknown; unknown
accounts for fully 33 percent of the sample.17
market income identifiable as accruing to a particular individual include wages,
as well as public and private pensions
6. Benefit income identifiable with an
individual, rather than a household, includes both social retirement and
unemployment benefits.
The proportions of market and benefit income received by each group
divided by the proportion of that group within each country’s population are
presented in Table 5. If a group received the exact proportion of market income
as it represented in the population, the number reported will be 1.00.
The point of this analysis is to investigate whether or not the “familial”
nations of Italy and Spain manifest a relatively patriarchal concentration of
market and benefit income on older, married men, as compared with countries
with other regimes.
Concentration of Market Income
It does appear true that in each country, married men earn a disproportionate
share of market income, and that the relative proportions are highest in Italy and
Spain. However, the Spanish figures are marred
6 However public pension data are not available for Sweden, Norway or Australia, while
neither private nor public pension information is available for France.18
Table 5
Concentration of Wage and Benefit Income by Sex, Age and Marital Status
“Familial” Conservative Social-Democratic Liberal
% Income type/ Italy Spain France Germany Norway Sweden U.S. Australia
% Population (’95) (’90) (’94) (’94) (’95) (’95) (’94) (’94)
Market Income
Single men 0.85 1.18 0.97 1.13 0.94 0.68 0.75 1.00
Single Women 0.65 0.55 0.81 0.98 0.68 0.86 0.59 0.81
Div./wid. Men 0.83 N.A. 1.12 0.65 1.27 N.A. 1.15 0.98
Div./wid. Women 0.48 N.A. 0.42 0.63 0.60 N.A. 0.67 0.40
Young, mar men 1.80 1.98 1.43 1.68 1.53 0.05 1.28 1.58
Young mar. women 0.80 0.54 0.92 0.80 0.80 0.02 0.65 0.90
Older mar men 1.71 1.70 1.34 1.79 1.54 1.97 1.81 1.56
Older mar. women 0.70 0.30 0.90 0.58 0.83 0.65 0.76 0.65
Benefit Income
Single men 0.12 2.43 0.46 0.15 0.46 0.94 0.26 0.72
Single Women 0.22 3.03 0.61 0.42 0.61 1.19 0.27 0.58
Div./wid. Men 2.82 N.A. 1.62 2.04 1.62 N.A. 1.57 2.10
Div./wid. Women 2.70 N.A. 2.01 2.01 2.35 N.A. 2.18 3.50
Young, mar men 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.23 0.37 0.14 0.68
Young mar. women 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.41 0.43 0.09 0.31
Older mar men 1.76 1.57 1.14 1.14 1.29 1.28 1.54 0.87
Older mar. women 0.54 0.21 0.41 0.41 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.71
_________________________________________________________________
Notes: Limited data on marital status for Spain and Sweden indicates only married and
unmarried; Spanish data includes large group of persons of unknown marital status. Market
income sources include wages and public and private pensions, except for Sweden, Norway,
and Australia for which public pension data is not available and France, for which no pension
data is available. Benefit income includes social retirement and unemployment benefits.
By the high proportion of the Spanish sample for whom marital status is
unknown—33 percent! Spanish men of uncertain marital status’ market
earnings ratio to their proportion in the population is 1.7, so they are probably
mostly married men, though they may be high earning singles. The figure for
women of unknown marital status is 0.30, again close to that of older, married
women.
Given that married men earn a high proportion of wages relative to their
numbers everywhere, it is also true that this phenomenon is particularly
pronounced in the familial nations of Italy and Spain, as well as in Sweden and
the United States. The Swedish figures for young married people’s share of
market earnings are so implausible as to cast doubt on all of the Swedish
results—from this point, Swedish market earnings will be ignored in the
discussion. While older married men in the U.S. are doing quite well, younger
married men are faring more poorly in the U.S. than in any other nation.19
If a hallmark of a patriarchal economy is the relative disenfranchisement
of young men in the labor market, it is also true that single men in Italy and the
U.S. earn the lowest share of wages of any of the nations investigated, barring
Sweden. The Spanish numbers would belie the idea that familial nations are
necessarily more patriarchal, were it not for the fact that the Spanish
classifications do not allow a separation of divorced and widowed men from
never married men. The apparent high earnings of Spanish single men may be
an over-estimate, if divorced and widowed men earn more than never married
men, as is true in France, Norway and the U.S., if not in Italy, Germany or
Australia. However, again, given the large group of Spanish for whom marital
status is unknown, little should be made of the Spanish findings.
The U.S. appears strongly patriarchal, based upon the large share of
earnings gained by older married men, and the particularly weak position of
single men. The relatively low earnings of young married men flags the
seriously declining prospects of the young in the United States, connected with
the large increase in earnings inequality in that nation. While relative youth
unemployment figures do not approach those of Greece, Italy or Turkey, as was
seen in Table 3, the earnings of American young men and women have declined
significantly in real terms over the last twenty years (Blanchflower and Freeman
2000). This may indeed be a patriarchal pattern, though a different one than that
found in Southern Europe.
To sum up, men are earning a disproportionate share of market income in
each of the nations examined. While this is particularly true in the familial
countries, it is also strongly apparent in the U.S., where inequality along many
dimensions, including age, has increased significantly. However, older married
men are not doing markedly better than are young married men in general,
which may be because the older, married category includes a high number of
retired men. Further analysis should perhaps separate the retired population
from working people. Single men do appear to be particularly disadvantaged in
the labor market in Italy and in the U.S.—disregarding Swedish numbers as
unreliable. Interestingly young married men in Italy appear to be faring
exceptionally well—disregarding the Spanish numbers as tainted--though this
may result from “creaming,” as this category in Italy is so small; it may well be
that only the small minority of young Italian men who are doing well are
marrying, as the age of first marriage is now quite high in Italy.
Benefit Income
Benefit income is universally concentrated on divorced and widowed women
and men. This result is hardly surprising, since the benefits considered are
social retirement and unemployment payments. The high rate of benefit20
recipiency among Spanish single people is presumably due to the lack of a
separate categories in the Spanish data for divorced, widowed and never
married people. As with the market earnings, it may well pay to distinguish
people of retirement age from the rest of the adult population in future work.
The group next most likely to receive benefits disproportionate to their numbers
are older, married men, who presumably also include a number of retirees.
Divorced and widowed women in all nations, with the exception of Italy,
are more likely to receive benefits than are divorced and widowed men, Perhaps
a higher proportion of the women are elderly, widows rather than divorced,
since women tend to live longer than men do.
These numbers do not provide any suggestion that young men, who are
disproportionately unemployed, are enjoying a great deal of support in the form
of unemployment benefits. However, never married men are more likely to
receive benefits than are young married men, indicating perhaps the greater
incidence of unemployment among the unmarried—or the lower rate of
marriage among the unemployed—though young single men may also be
receiving some form of social retirement benefit, if they are minors with
deceased fathers.
Never married women show a higher benefit recipiency rate than do
never married men in all nations with the exception of the liberal regimes of the
U.S. and Australia. It is difficult, however, to use these figures to gauge support
for unmarried mothers. Only the components of income that could be directly
attributable to individuals in a multi-person household have been included in
this analysis. This means that many benefits of interest—including child
allowances, parental leave allowances and veterans’ allowances—are not
accounted for. Similarly, self-employment income was not included in the
section on market income, as it is recorded only for households, rather than for
persons.
In further investigations, household level data will be considered, in order
to attempt to gain a more comprehensive picture of market and benefit incomes.
Indeed, as presently conceived, this analysis suffers from the same limitations
that marred Esping-Andersen’s earlier work; it excludes too many sources of
income that relate to defamilialization. However, the effort to expand the kinds
of benefits and sources of income considered includes its own complications—
beyond even the necessary assumptions, such as the attribution of household
self-employment earnings to particular household members. As Esping-
Andersen (1990) has pointed out, it is not clear whether household members
perceive benefits income as accruing to women or to men in situations where
benefit checks for child allowances are paid to the male head of household.
While the researcher may understand such a benefit to be directed toward21
subsidizing reproduction—traditionally women’s work—men to whom the
checks are mailed may view the money as income accruing to family heads.
V. CONCLUSION
The evidence marshalled thus far does suggest that the Southern European
economies are distinctively familial—or patriarchal—in their concentration of
income, employment and benefits upon older married men. Young men are
disproportionately unemployed or out of the labor force in Southern Europe--
and Asia--as compared with Scandinavia, Central Europe and the liberal,
English speaking nations. Never married men’s incomes are low in Italy.
Women’s labor force participation rates are relatively low, and women’s unpaid
workweeks are high in Italy and Spain. Public welfare programs are limited in
Southern Europe and benefits are focused on the elderly.
An unexpected finding is the degree to which the United States appears to
also concentrate income in the hands of older married men, a result tied to the
high and increasing levels of income inequality in the U.S. It may well be that
the category of patriarchal economies does not dovetail well with Esping-
Andersen and others’ previously developed classifications for describing
different welfare state regimes. A more complex system of categorization will
be necessary to incorporate a full gender analysis of our economic systems.
The empirical analysis in this paper would be stronger with several
additions. First, it is difficult to locate information on the situation of young
men, including the degree to which welfare programs support young men in
different countries and the amount of unpaid work young men may be providing
their families. Second, it would be useful to re-do the analysis of the
Luxembourg Income Study data, concentrating on all sources of household
income, rather than only on those clearly attributable to particular individuals,
as was done here. Finally, it may be constructive to explore the utility of a
decomposable Gini index for assessing within and between group inequality
among different household types in different regimes (Milanovic and Yitzhaki,
2000).
In future work, the consequences of familial—or patriarchal—economic
organization should be investigated. The economic costs of family-based social
insurance systems may be significant. Family-based insurance mechanisms are
by their very nature are unable to spread risk over more than a relatively few
individuals, individuals who are likely to be quite homogeneous in terms of
geographical location, occupation, industry, and even educational level.
It may also be that particularly patriarchal economies result in distortions
in the labor market. Where older, married men enjoy the strongest social claims22
on both labor markets and welfare systems, the logical result would be that
women’s and young men’s labor is relatively—and, in some sense, artificially—
cheap
7. Family heads with women’s and young men’s labor at their disposal
face incentives to allocate that labor in less productive ways than would be the
case if opportunities were greater for women and young men in the labor
market, and social claims on their time were less. In economic terms, we may
expect (1) unemployment, underemployment and mis-allocation of women’s
and young men’s labor and, relatedly (2) sub-optimal training and education
decisions—human capital investments—made by and for young women and
men.
The sustainability of Mediterranean systems may indeed be called into
question if the potential for mis-training and mis-allocation of labor results in a
technological lag, and underdevelopment of the high-tech and service sectors
underpinning growth and competitiveness in the globalizing economy. Outside
the Mediterranean, young men and women of all ages constitute both the labor
force for emerging sectors as well as markets that may stimulate further
development
8.
7 I call women and young men’s labor cheap because their high unemployment rates imply that
their labor is cheap or free to household heads. Paradoxically, one of the mechanisms that
contributes to high youth and female unemployment rates and low participation rates of these
groups in the formal labor market may be relatively egalitarian wage structures—including
relatively high wages for women and young men—in formal labor markets (Bertola and
Ichino 1995).
8  On the other hand, of course, many in the United States—where both
employment/population rates and work hours are high (Nickell 1997, p. 58)--feel that the
American way is not humanly sustainable, that the quality of life has suffered from devoting
too many hours to the labor market and too much concern to the acquisition of material things
(e.g. Schor 1991).23
A final concern for sustainability stems from long-term labor supply, the low
fertility rates that appear to be another result of the “familial” social systems,
presaging a crisis in the provision of social insurance for the aged (Bettio and




Banca D’Italia. 2000. Supplementi al Bollettino Statistico, Note metodologiche
e informazioni statistiche: I balanci delle famiglie italiane nee’anno 1998. Anno
X, Numero 22.
www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/statische/ibf/microdati/dati/archivi_annuali.
Bergmann, Barbara. 1996. Saving Our Children from Poverty: What the United
States Can Learn From France. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Bertola, Giuseppe and Andrea Ichino. 1995. “Wage Inequality and
Unemployment: United States vs. Europe.” in Ben S. Bernanke and Julio J.
Rotemberg (eds.) NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, pp. 13-54.
Bettio, Francesca and Paola Villa. 1998. “A Mediterranean Perspective on the
Breakdown of the Relationship Between Participation and Fertility.”
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 22 (2): 137-171.
Blanchflower, David G. and Richard B. Freeman. 2000. “The Declining
Economic Status of Young Workers in OECD Countries.” Youth Employment
and Joblessness in Advanced Countries. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, pp. 19-55.
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2000. “Gender Differences in Pay.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14 (4):75-99.
Caspar, Lynne M., Irwin Garfinkel and Sara S. McLanahan. 1994. “The
Gender-Poverty Gap: What We Can Learn From Other Countries.” American
Sociological Review. 59 (4): 594-605.24
de la Rica, Sara and Thomas Lemieux. 1994. “Does Public Health Insurance
Reduce Labor Market Flexibility or Encourage the Underground Economy?
Evidence from Spain and the United States.” in Rebecca M. Blank (ed.) Social
Protection versus Economic Flexibility. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, pp. 265-299.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial
Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fernandez-Morales, Antonio and Julia de haro-Garcia. 1998. Journal of Income
Distribution. 8: 235-239.
Folbre, Nancy. 1980. “Patriarchy in Colonial New England.” The Review of
Radical Political Economics. 12 (2): 4-13.
Folbre, Nancy. 2001. “Public Support for Parents,” in Mary C. King (ed.)
Squaring Up: Policy Strategies to Raise Women’s Incomes in the United States.
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 63-85.
Heidi Hartmann. 1976. “Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex,” in
Martha Blaxall and Barbara Reagan (eds.) Women and the Workplace: The
Implications of Occupational Segregation. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Hartmann, Heidi. 1981. “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism:
Towards a More Progressive Union.” in Lydia Sargent (ed.) Women and
Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.
Boston: South End Press, pp. 1-41.
ISTAT. 2000. Rapporto Annuale: La situazione del Paese nel 1999.
www.istat.it/Aproserv/noved/rapann99/index.html.25
Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2000. “Decomposing World Income
Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?” World Bank Working
Paper, December.
Nickell, Stephen. 1997. “Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe
versus North America.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 11 (3): 55-74.
Olmsted, Jennifer. 2001. “Gendered Social Safety Nets in a Period of
Demographic Transition: A Focus on the MENA Region.” Unpublished paper,
presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting,
Florence, Italy, March.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1999. Labour Force
Statistics 1977-1997. Paris: OECD.
Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The
Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States.” American
Sociological Review 58 (3): 303-328.
Reich, Michael. 1981. Racial Inequality: A Political-Economic Analysis.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rubery, Jill. 1998. “Women in the Labour Market: A Gender Equality
Perspective.” OECD Working Paper 6 (75).
Rubery, Jill with Francesca Bettio, Marilyn Carroll, Colette Fagan, Damian
Grimshaw, Friederike Maier, Sigrid Quack and Paloa Villa. 1998. Equal Pay in
Europe? Closing the Gender Wage Gap. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Schor, Juliet B. 1991. The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of
Leisure. Basic Books.
Tilly, Louise A. and Joan W. Scott. 1978. Women, Work and Family. New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.26
Yousef, Tarik. 2001. “Demography, Inequality and Intergenerational Conflict in
the Middle East and North Africa.” Unpublished paper, presented at the Second
Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, Florence, Italy, March.